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With the end of communism in Hungary, many  people eagerly assumed that the 
physical and symbolic remnants of the past era would similarly vanish from pub-
lic life and everyday activity. All that remained was to sweep away the detritus of 
the recent past: a pro cess wittily depicted by one of the campaign posters for the 
Hungarian Demo cratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF), the winning 
party of Hungary’s first postsocialist demo cratic elections in 1990. “National 
spring cleaning!” (Országos tavaszi nagytakarítást) the poster announced, with a 
photo graph of a garbage can overflowing with a statue of Stalin, Mao’s  Little Red 
Book, and other party memorabilia. This vivid visual argument jokingly played 
on Trotsky’s famous phrase by tossing the formerly venerated objects of official 
state culture into a literal dustbin of history.
Meanwhile, in everyday life, Hungarians celebrated the end of the regime 
with ironic “retro” parties and new entrepreneurial ventures that marketed the 
relics of official state culture as kitsch to both locals and foreign tourists. For 
example, just a few blocks from Moscow Square (a central transportation hub in 
Budapest), young entrepreneurs opened a communist- themed pizzeria  under 
the name of “Marxim”— a play on both the famous Pa ri sian restaurant “Maxim” 
and Marxism. With a red star over its door and an interior decorated with im-
ages of Lenin and other state socialist kitsch, the restaurant was the subject of 
local and international news articles gleefully reporting that the newly cap i tal ist 
Hungary was now making a profit out of socialism’s remains. The pizzeria’s hu-




hangout in the early years of postsocialism. As the  owners declared on Marxim’s 
menu, “The outside may be communist but we are cap i tal ist to the very marrow of 
our bones.”
Such images and stories from the time of Hungary’s po liti cal transition sought 
to portray the disorienting transformation of everyday life into history as a pro-
cess that was both natu ral and inevitable: a return to national authenticity by elim-
inating the debris of foreign occupation. Although similar examples can be 
found across the region, in Hungary the stakes of this transformation from So-
viet satellite to member of demo cratic Eu rope  were particularly high. Beginning 
in the early 1960s,  under the leadership of General Secretary János Kádár, Hun-
garians had enjoyed greater liberties and a higher standard of living than many 
of their Soviet bloc neighbors. This experience of “goulash communism,” as well 
as participation in the thriving second economy of late socialism, now inspired 
many Hungarians to consider themselves well- poised to lead the region in join-
ing the West as po liti cal and economic equals, ready to take their place in the new 
global order. Even the peaceful demise of the regime itself— a bloodless and largely 
bureaucratic affair— offered a welcome contrast to the violent po liti cal upheav-
als that had punctuated Hungary’s tumultuous twentieth  century. Demonstrating 
mastery over socialism’s material and meta phorical remains thus appeared to be 
one of the final steps to transform socialist citizens into new postsocialist subjects— 
and to enter the demo cratic and prosperous  future that awaited them.
FIgure 0.1 “National spring cleaning!” MDF campaign poster. Artwork by Béla 
Aba, 1990.
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Nearly twenty years  later, in 2009, a dif fer ent mood prevailed as I sat in Marxim 
with my good friend Levente, then in his early forties. Levente had mentioned that 
he had met some friends  there a few weeks before, and when I expressed my sur-
prise that Marxim was still in business, he suggested that I join him  there for lunch. 
Like many  others, Levente had come to regard his initial expectations of the po liti-
cal transformation as painfully optimistic and naive. Such disappointment has be-
come endemic to the region (Ghodsee 2011), but thanks to the 2008 global eco-
nomic crisis that hit Hungary with disproportionate force, the disenchantment in 
Hungary was particularly acute. That year, a Pew Research study announced that 
72  percent of the Hungarians they surveyed believed that they  were currently worse 
off eco nom ically than they had been  under communism (Pew Global Attitudes 
Proj ect 2009, 5). No other postsocialist country in the survey expressed such wide-
spread dissatisfaction. Indeed, the relative lack of interest in celebrating the twenti-
eth anniversary of 1989 suggested that the end of state socialist rule no longer rep-
resented a chronological break, but instead a failed point of origin— a lost 
opportunity for cultural, po liti cal, and economic transformation.
Surprisingly, this disillusionment did not fuel a nostalgic desire to return to 
the communist past. Rather, it reflected a frustrated orientation  toward the  future: 
the disappointment that the bright  future promised by the end of communism 
had still not materialized. This logic— one that mourned not “what I once had,” 
but “what I should already have”— became clear to me as my friend and I waited 
for our pizza and discussed the effects of the financial crisis on his parents’ finances 
and his own opportunities for freelance work as an editor and translator. In the 
midst of our conversation, he paused to look at Marxim’s empty  tables and its 
faded, dusty furnishings with a rueful smile. “Even this place is over its prime,” 
he told me, gesturing at a propaganda poster. “Making fun of this stuff feels odd 
now,  because no one says  things like that anymore.” Marxim no longer inspired 
laughter at the former era. Instead, Levente told me, it made him feel wistful for 
the optimism of the early years of postsocialism, when as a young university stu-
dent entering adulthood, it seemed as if one could indeed remember the past only 
to laugh at it. “It’s not a place to ironically remember the communist past any-
more,” he concluded. “It’s become a memory to itself, to how it used to be fifteen 
years ago.” Once a triumphant display of mastery over the remainders of the com-
munist era, Marxim was now itself a relic of the failed hopes of transition.
Yet the obsolescence of Marxim’s memory work does not mean that other at-
tempts to banish or domesticate Hungary’s remains of socialism  were outdated. 
Instead, Hungary’s recent experiences of crisis and disappointment only inspired 
renewed complaints that transition had failed  because the past had not been dealt 
with correctly. A few months  after my lunch at Marxim, in the spring of 2010, the 
Hungarian electorate voted into power the right- wing po liti cal party Fidesz,1 
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which pledged to repair the missed opportunities of two de cades  earlier by fi nally 
accomplishing a “revolution” that would leave the socialist past  behind. As part 
of this work of completing Hungary’s transition from socialism, the local gov-
ernment in Budapest returned “Moscow Square” to its pre-1951 name of “Kálmán 
Széll Square” in 2011.
Unlike a generation  earlier, however, Fidesz did not remove such remains of 
socialism simply to break from the socialist era. Instead, by declaring it urgent to 
eradicate the name “Moscow” from the cityscape two de cades  after the departure 
of Soviet troops, Fidesz revived the past as an ongoing danger that was necessary 
to fight. Over its first term in power (2010–2014), Fidesz would use the claim 
that it was fi nally eliminating Hungary’s remains of socialism as one of its justi-
fications for enacting sweeping  legal and constitutional changes that threatened 
much of the past de cades’ demo cratic pro gress. Remains of socialism now enabled 
 these po liti cal actors not to bury the socialist era, but to keep it alive as a prob lem 
that only they could solve.
This book is about the shifting fates of the memory of the socialist past in post-
socialist Hungary. Beginning in the early 1990s, it spans more than two de cades 
FIgure 0.2 Interior of Marxim restaurant. Personal photo graph, 2017.
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of po liti cal and social transformation to examine attempts at “spring cleaning” the 
remains of the past era from both private life and public culture— and to analyze 
the obstacles that would emerge to frustrate this fantasy of historical mastery. To 
do so, I introduce the concept of “remains”— both physical objects and cultural 
remainders—to symbolize all that Hungarians sought to leave  behind as they 
strug gled to remake themselves as new postsocialist subjects. Their heated attempts 
to master the obstinate remainders of an ambivalent past also became strug gles to 
determine the  future, as well as to mourn the  futures that  were never realized.
Like  every postsocialist country, Hungary’s physical and cultural landscapes 
are permeated by residues and legacies of four de cades of state socialist rule. In-
deed, the condition of subsisting among remnants of discredited pasts and failed 
historical trajectories may not be the exception but the norm in this age of “post”s. 
But in my formulation, “remains” are far more than simply the obvious material 
leftovers and legacies of Soviet occupation (what would be called maradvány in 
Hungarian). Instead, I argue for conceptualizing remains as produced by a mod-
ern historical optics that anxiously scans the pre sent for threatening signs of an 
unwanted past and thus undesired  future. Par tic u lar remains only intrude and 
demand attention at certain moments, by certain  people, and to certain ends—
as the impermanence of Marxim’s memory work in the early years of postsocial-
ism demonstrates. The  battles to define what constitutes a remain of socialism, 
and how best to banish or master it, thus represent an active, contested, and shift-
ing pro cess through which  people in Hungary— from politicians and activists 
to artists and entrepreneurs— strug gled both to distance the recent past and to 
express fantasies and fears about the  future yet to come.
In the chapters that follow, I track the changing fortunes of socialism’s remains 
in order to perform an archaeology of postsocialism’s  future hopes and present- 
day frustrations, beginning with the optimism of the early years of transition and 
ending with the po liti cal and economic crises that inspired Hungary’s recent turn 
 toward illiberal democracy and what critics view as right- wing authoritarianism. 
The heterogeneity of the cultural objects, sites, and sentiments that emerged in 
Hungary’s public culture as remains of state socialism—as well as the communities 
of memory that produced and  were produced by  these relics— demands a method-
ology that follows a similarly varied and restless path. My analy sis thus moves in 
roughly chronological order to travel among museums and monuments, public 
protests and cele brations, and private stories, jokes, and conversations. Each chap-
ter investigates a cultural object that exemplifies the logic of remains: from exiled 
statues of Lenin and commodified relics of state socialist mass culture to discred-
ited official histories and the scandalous secrets of the communist regime’s inform-
ers. My examination of the dif fer ent tensions and contradictions embodied by 
each set of remains enables me to illuminate some of the key moments in 
6 INtroductIoN
Hungary’s postsocialist po liti cal and social transformations and to demonstrate 
that the debates and controversies  these remains inspired did not merely reflect but 
actively produced far- ranging shifts in Hungary’s politics of memory.
Over time, as the joyful optimism of “spring cleaning” gave way to the unex-
pected challenges of demo cratic politics and participation in the market econ-
omy, each attempt to dispose of the remnants of an unwanted past would fail to 
produce the desired pre sent, thus leaving the search for remains to begin anew. 
Ultimately, the  battle over remains would symbolize not the promise of master-
ing the past, but rather the perceived impossibility of  doing so. The prob lem of 
remains would come to represent the frustrated ambitions of transition itself, by 
offering a way to explain the disappointments of the pre sent as the failure to leave 
the past  behind.
Why Remains?
The stories told about memory at the margins of the West tend to be narratives 
of loss and ruination, macabre relics and spectral hauntings.2  These studies offer 
impor tant insights into how the traumas and injustices of the past continue to 
affect present- day politics and society. Their focus on unwelcome legacies of trou-
bled pasts has also provided a crucial corrective to presentist models of memory 
that, as Richard Werbner argues, “reduce memory to an artefact of the  here and 
now, as if it  were merely a backwards construction  after the fact” (1998, 2). In-
stead, he maintains, “intractable traces of the past are felt on  people’s bodies, 
known in their landscapes, landmarks and souvenirs, and perceived as the tough 
moral fabric of their social relations” (2–3).
Although the conceptual vocabulary of ghosts, ruins, and similar meta phors 
of an unmastered past is valuable, it nevertheless risks limiting our attention to 
only the negative experiences of the past’s remainders. This tendency is common 
in the interdisciplinary field of memory studies, due to the centrality of the 
Holocaust and psychoanalytic theories of trauma in some of its initial formulations.3 
Scholars have recently called for expanding the range of the affects we study: to 
move beyond the dysphoria of trauma, mourning, and melancholia to also con-
sider plea sure and laughter, and to ask how such varied responses interact with 
nonmemorial affects to produce “affective ecologies” that ground dispositions 
 toward past history as well as con temporary politics (Vermeulen 2012, 232; Ham-
ilton 2010). This approach is particularly crucial in the postsocialist context 
where, as Alexei Yurchak reminds us, we cannot understand the socialist past with-
out appreciating “the creative and positive meanings with which [citizens] en-
dowed their socialist lives— sometimes in line with the announced goals of the 
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state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that 
did not fit either-or dichotomies” (2005, 9).
I thus use the more flexible language of remains, which we can consider most 
simply as “ matter out of time” (to borrow from Mary Douglas’s famous formu-
lation of dirt as “ matter out of place” [2002, 36]), to emphasize the ambiguities 
of the recent past and the ambivalent emotions it continues to evoke:  whether 
anger, sadness, humor, boredom, veneration, disgust—or affection. Even pain-
ful remembrances of guilt or persecution can inspire creative acts of cultural 
imagination.4  Whether socialist remains arouse embittered laments, nostalgic 
longing, or mocking laughter, they nonetheless offer ways to articulate new forms 
of value, identity, and aspiration vis- à- vis both the problematic past and an uncer-
tain  future.
Moreover, many of the established tropes of an unpalatable past also embed 
temporal assumptions about the fate of that past,  whether the ghost’s threatened 
return or the ruin’s failure to materialize the anticipated  future.5 In contrast, my 
conceptual framework of “remains” avoids assuming in advance the trajectories 
that the past’s afterlives may take. By tracing the evolution of postsocialist mem-
ory practices over more than two de cades, my analy sis emphasizes the imperma-
nence and contingency of each attempt at historical mastery, and how once- settled 
questions and  battles would repeatedly reemerge in public life.6 This longitudi-
nal approach thus focuses attention on the ways in which dif fer ent remains at 
dif fer ent moments enter or fade out of cultural focus. It demonstrates that the 
pro cess of identifying and grappling with socialist remains is contested and 
dynamic, formulated and reformulated in response to a changing pre sent.
In other words, although my study shares the critique of approaches whose 
“tendency  toward voluntarism” (Olick 2003, 7) reduces the burden of the past to 
merely a projection of the pre sent, I do not view  these historical traces as entirely 
predetermined or intractable. Instead, I insist on the agency of the vari ous social 
and po liti cal actors who battled to define the  future by eliminating signs of the 
past’s unwanted presence. Although they each viewed the past as a prob lem to be 
solved, the nature and location of this burden, the meanings assigned to it, and 
who felt it most acutely varied across communities and over time. Moreover, 
I build on Jeffrey Olick’s insight that “memorymakers  don’t always succeed in 
creating the images they want and in having them understood in the ways they 
intended” (2003, 7) to show how each attempt to determine and master the past 
via a specific set of remains only sparked further debate and controversy. The em-
phases and elisions to be found in any given form of remains would lay the 
groundwork for the ways  people would define and encounter  future ones.
To support  these arguments, I draw inspiration from several critical trajecto-
ries. The first is the anthropological critique of postsocialist transitology. Much 
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as Katherine Verdery anticipated in her 1996 study, What Was Socialism, and What 
Comes Next?, the past de cades have demonstrated the failure of early models of 
“transition” that predicted a unilinear transformation from the socialist era into 
a  future predetermined by Western ideal types of the  free market and liberal de-
mocracy (15–16).7 I extend this critique of teleological narratives of economic 
pro gress and the victory of consumer capitalism to the politics of memory, arguing 
against the assumption that the demise of state socialism entailed the fracturing 
of one historical narrative and its replacement by another: the unproblematic 
return of “au then tic” history out of the deep freeze of state amnesia.8 Instead, re-
mains are emblematic of the uneven and conflicting trajectories of historical and 
cultural transformation: at once out of time and yet all too pre sent.
My second inspiration is Walter Benjamin’s unfinished work on the nineteenth- 
century proto- shopping malls, the Paris arcades. Faded and unfashionable by 
the time of his research in the 1920s and 1930s, the obsolete architecture and out-
dated commodities of the arcades  were relics of an  earlier, more optimistic era of 
consumer culture— and thus, in Benjamin’s view, a crucial site to excavate cap i-
tal ist modernity’s past fantasies and aspirations (Benjamin 2002). His analy sis of 
the forgotten dreams and utopian hopes that lay petrified in the now- worthless 
detritus of a past era guides my own investigation of Hungary’s politics of mem-
ory. My emphasis on remains as sites to imagine better tomorrows and to mourn 
the  futures that never came to pass treats hope and aspiration as ethnographic 
categories, by studying not merely what is and what was, but also what my sub-
jects  imagined might be. Remains thus both fracture triumphalist narratives of 
historical pro gress and offer new possibilities of disrupting the pre sent by remind-
ing us of its unrealized  futures— whether the fantasy of Western consumerist 
abundance, the hopes that democracy would bring historical justice and restitu-
tion, or the utopian impulses of the state socialist proj ect itself (Benjamin 2002; 
Buck- Morss 1989, 2000). Rather than view the past and  future in opposition, 
I thus join recent work in anthropology that emphasizes the coconstruction of past 
and  future, in which “memory practices form an explicit part of future- making” 
(Shaw 2013).9
This focus on the cultural productivity of an outdated and unwanted past 
resonates with the third and final body of lit er a ture that inspired this study: 
psychoanalytic theories of subject formation, which understand identity as con-
stituted through not only positive identifications but also negative disavowals. 
Specifically, my use of “remains” parallels Jacques Lacan’s concept of the remain-
der (as objet petit a): that ele ment of the subject that is split from itself in order 
to produce itself as unitary and coherent.10 That is, I argue that the crises of con-
temporaneity embodied by remains (what constitutes the pre sent? what is rejected 
as merely past?)  were ultimately crises of subjectivity: how to define who “we” 
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are and what is “ours.” Such questions are of course endemic to modernity, but 
they had par tic u lar inflection for the citizens of the Soviet bloc, who viewed the 
communist system as inhumane and unnatural and who used the regime’s sup-
pression of “true history” as a power ful means of po liti cal mobilization.  After the 
end of the regime, they thus battled to produce themselves as new postsocialist 
subjects by renarrating long- familiar ele ments of public and everyday life as mere 
Soviet anachronism, and thus a divergence from the au then tic course of national 
history.
Such memory work could not entirely efface the contradiction at the heart of 
the experience of late state socialism,11 which many Hungarians experienced as 
injustice and oppression and a relatively peaceful and materially secure existence: 
that is, both the vio lence of repression and the modest luxuries of “refrigerator 
socialism” and the campfire songs of the Young Pioneers.12  These dichotomized 
visions of the socialist past did not stand in  simple opposition (a logic that Yurchak 
has critiqued as “binary socialism” [2005, 4]).13 Rather, they reflected the paradoxi-
cal nature of po liti cal citizenship during late socialism.  After Hungary’s failed 
revolution against Soviet rule in 1956 and the harsh years of retaliation that fol-
lowed, the regime sought to normalize relations with its citizenry by rewarding 
those who withdrew from po liti cal protest into a relatively comfortable and 
seemingly depoliticized private sphere. Over the de cades, as the regime steadily 
increased the population’s living standards and access to consumer goods, many 
of its citizens became accustomed to seeking meaning and fulfillment in their do-
mestic activity ( whether  family life or working in the second economy) and  were 
encouraged to regard the public world of politics as mostly irrelevant to their 
personal concerns. But this perception of being able to pursue private endeavors 
relatively in de pen dently from politics did not represent autonomy from the re-
gime. Rather, it was one of the very ways that the regime secured its legitimation. 
In fact, as Martha Lampland argues, the stark public/private divide helped to 
reproduce the system by convincing  people that they  were powerless to change 
it, as well as encouraging them to overlook commonalities among the values, 
practices, and beliefs in both realms (1995, 245–247).
In the early years  after the end of state socialism, the coziness and familiarity 
of socialist remains, as much as the painful memories of foreign occupation they 
also embodied, would pre sent a challenge for a new Hungary now defined as the 
very negation of the past era. In everyday conversation, many  people readily dis-
cussed pleasant memories of the recent past or drew negative comparisons be-
tween then and now,  whether that concerned economic hardship and the loss of 
social welfare mea sures, new scandals of greed and corruption by Hungary’s 
emerging po liti cal and economic elites, or the growing disappointment with a 
Western consumer culture that stigmatized Hungarian goods and consumers as 
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inferior. But most  people  were also aware that such positive evaluations of the 
past could not be widely expressed in public or po liti cal forums without seeming 
to endorse the oppressive politics of the previous regime and to confirm a West-
ern hierarchy that condemned such sentiments as evidence of Hungary’s failed 
modernity.
In postsocialist media discourse, po liti cal rhe toric, and symbolic and  actual en-
counters with the “West,”14 many Hungarians thus learned to regard the recent 
past with discomfort and to treat  these two sets of memories as incommensura-
ble. Lacan’s formulation of the remainder as that part of self that is outside the 
self— both an alien presence and uncomfortably familiar— helps to illuminate the 
ways that remains of socialism would unsettle the fantasy of a clean break with a 
foreign past.15 Remains seemed to offer the possibility of historical mastery, but 
they also troubled the fiction of a unified national subjectivity by threatening to 
make vis i ble  those intimate aspects of collective historical experience that  people 
now felt compelled to reject.
Unmastering the Past
My analy sis of remains as both symbolizing and frustrating the desire for a mas-
tered past is thus not another story of the “crisis” of historical memory and na-
tional identity in Eastern Eu rope. This is a familiar narrative of journalists and 
scholars who have treated the status of memory in the former Soviet bloc as a 
crucial diagnostic of national health: viewing a lack of historical consensus as 
pathological and analyzing the literal content of memorial practices for signs of 
danger— whether “too much,” “not enough,” or the “wrong” kinds of memory 
altogether.16 In the first de cade of postsocialism, for example, any sign of positive 
remembrance of the socialist past in the region— whether expressed as nostalgia 
for its mass culture or the success of communist successor parties in demo cratic 
elections— sparked a flurry of media and scholarly concern that the country’s 
demo cratic transformation was in danger. And observers not only patholo-
gized the communist past: while they hailed Eastern Eu rope’s “return to history” 
in the form of revived cultural identities and the rectification of communism’s 
historical distortions, they also feared that the renewal of national identification 
would lead to vio lence (as in the war in Yugo slavia) or the persecution of ethnic 
minorities.
Such moral panics,  whether originating locally or abroad,  were often driven 
by the desire to establish demo cratic po liti cal norms, to pay justice to history’s 
victims, and to forestall the repetition of vio lence in the  future. But the language 
of pathology their rhe toric deployed also embedded normative assumptions about 
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what proper “mourning,” “remembrance,” and “coming to terms” with the past 
might look like— and often presumed that memory practices in the West repre-
sent the standard to which all  others should aspire. Indeed, if the end of com-
munism in Eastern Eu rope represented a “return to history,” many in the West 
hailed the demise of its Cold War  enemy as signaling the “end of history” (Fuku-
yama 1992) that proved conclusively the triumph of liberal democracy and obvi-
ated the need for any critical examination of the West’s own mnemonic habits, 
distortions, and amnesias. This triumphalism has now begun to fade, as neo-
liberalism has fallen into crisis across the globe and the West’s mono poly of the 
 future seems less certain. And yet the fascination with how the countries of the 
former Soviet bloc remember has only become more acute, as a way for the West 
to buttress its shaky legitimacy by continuing to “fix Eastern Eu rope in the past” 
(Boyer 2010, 23).
Anthropologists have long critiqued such temporal disjunctions between the 
“normal” West and its “backward”  Others, burdened by inassimilable, pathologi-
cal pasts they are unwilling or unable to cast aside. This logic is perhaps exempli-
fied by the very use of the term “postsocialism” to describe a  limited region of 
the globe—as if the United States  were not also affected by the legacies and re-
mainders of the end of the Cold War. “Post” risks positioning its subjects— whether 
postauthoritarian, postcolonial, or postsocialist—as inhabiting the pre sent in a 
perpetual state of belatedness:, what Marianne Hirsch, in her study of “postmem-
ory,” calls “a location in an aftermath” (2012, 5).17
This denial of coevalness (Fabian 1983) is familiar from developmentalism, 
which similarly temporalizes spatial difference and subscribes to a notion of a sin-
gle modernity as an endpoint (Ferguson 2006; Gupta 1998). The vio lence of this 
subjectification enables two key po liti cal and historical elisions. First, the discourse 
of backwardness obscures commonalities and continuities across temporal and 
spatial divides: the way fantasies of being “new and modern . . .  [rely] on the sur-
vival of Soviet modes of existence” (Flatley 2001, 86), and how “the socialist 
proj ect, particularly its investment in heavy industry, was not restricted to the 
‘other’ Eu rope, nor did its lifeline terminate abruptly in 1989” (Scribner 2003, 
15, quoted in Petrović 2014, 100).
Second, this unilinear narrative of pro gress assumes that knowledge and value 
flow only from West to East (or Global North to Global South), and developmen-
tal time itself moves only in one direction. Yet, as scholars of both postsocialism 
and postcolonialism have argued, the fantasy of Eu ro pean modernity is not al-
ways a fantasy of futurity. For factory workers in the former Yugo slavia, their loss 
of prestige and declining production standards  after the end of state socialism only 
distanced them farther from Eu rope; in the words of one worker, “We  were much 
more a part of Eu rope in socialism than we are now” (Petrović 2010, 141). And 
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even the temporality of pro gress itself has become increasingly anachronistic. 
James Ferguson argues that Western discourse about Africa has become increas-
ingly de- developmentalized and detemporalized. That is, this logic no longer con-
siders the continent’s poorest countries to be temporally  behind the West, but 
permanently beneath it (2006, 189–190). For the Zambian mineworkers Ferguson 
interviewed, modernity thus “was not an anticipated  future but a dream to be 
remembered from the past” (186).
My analy sis extends  these scholars’ line of critique into the realm of memory, 
examining how the conditions for “entering Eu rope” and becoming fully “mod-
ern” included the demand that Eastern Eu rope sacrifice previous historical nar-
ratives ( whether communist or nationalist) and disavow the meaningfulness of 
 earlier lifeways. This imperative to transform both what and how the East remem-
bers also included the expectation that  these nation- states conform to Western 
Eu ro pean memory regimes, through which claims to national suffering or cul-
tural value are legible only insofar as they support preexisting conceptual frame-
works, such as the transcendent value of Eu ro pean liberalism, the centrality of 
the Holocaust for Eu ro pean memory, and the  battle against totalitarianism as the 
cornerstone of modern Eu ro pean identity (Kraenzle and Mayr 2017, Pakier and 
Wawrzyniak 2015). Many of the remains that I examine in this book thus emerge 
in tension with, or in response or re sis tance to, such transnational memory 
practices. For example, consumers of socialist nostalgia ironically refer to global 
discourses of cultural heritage to justify their enjoyment, and the local com-
memoration of victims of communism borrows from (and competes with) 
forms and practices of Holocaust commemoration established in Western Eu rope 
and North Amer i ca.
Like other countries of the former Soviet bloc, Hungary is famously concerned 
with questions of its past. The con temporary desire to identify usable national 
pasts and eliminate “inauthentic” ones is deeply rooted, particularly given the po-
liti cal disruptions and historical discontinuities of Hungary’s twentieth  century. 
But the production of remains— signs of an unwanted past that impedes enter-
ing the  future— reflects not only  these local pro cesses of memory. Instead, remains 
also exemplify the condition of being “post” in a temporalized global hierarchy. 
Remains represent local responses to the global production of both futurity and 
obsolescence, advancement and backwardness; they are symptoms of a global pol-
itics of the pre sent that is always in danger of excluding certain  peoples, land-
scapes, histories, and practices from flows of capital, information, and value.
Rather than interpret remains as a sign of national pathology, this book thus 
asks how, why, by whom, and in what ways the past becomes pathologized as a 
prob lem in the first place, and how this self- reflexive perception of a challenging 
past can be the source of present- day cultural productivity. I show how the worry 
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of not dealing with the past properly would provide new opportunities in both 
public and everyday life for Hungarians to narrate not only the recent experience 
of state socialism but also the bright hopes, per sis tent anx i eties, and increasingly 
sharp critiques that emerged from ongoing encounters and negotiations with 
global modernity.
Although my scope is  limited to the Hungarian context, my analy sis of so-
cialism’s remains is ultimately a study of modern historical subjectivity and the 
overlapping, incommensurable, and conflicting narrative horizons that compose 
it. Symbolizing that which was excluded in the formation of Hungary as a new 
postsocialist subject, remains became sites to articulate new positionalities vis- à- 
vis both an unwelcome past and a long- anticipated pre sent whose fantasies of 
demo cratic transparency and consumer plenitude would soon be disenchanted. 
The challenge of remains would provide a crucial way for Hungarians to voice 
growing concerns about the place of the nation in the new global order—as well 
as the fear that Hungary itself might be left aside and discarded as a mere remain 
of globalizing neoliberalism.
The Structure of This Book
During my fieldwork in the 1990s and 2000s,  there was hardly a sphere of po liti-
cal or public culture that was not saturated with attempts to discredit or enshrine 
almost  every impor tant historical figure from Hungary’s turbulent twentieth 
 century. Their stories  were often embedded in broader national narratives of 
mourning, martyrdom, victimhood, and defeat: during the twentieth  century, 
Hungary lost two world wars, was invaded by two major foreign powers (Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union), and lost two- thirds of its territory in the 1920 
Trianon peace treaty imposed  after its defeat in World War I. As István Rév 
observes, Hungary’s narrative of national selfhood has thus been one of “ battles 
lost, and consequently a continuous history of executions, exiles, and po liti cal 
suicides. The normal public rituals of Hungarian history are, accordingly, not 
victory parades but funerals and reburials” (Rév 2005, 41–42). Moreover,  these 
po liti cal upheavals also brought about profound social and economic transfor-
mations. Hungary went from being a multinational empire dominated by Hun-
garian elites to an almost monoethnic state with significant parts of the ethnic 
Hungarian community becoming minorities in neighboring countries. The coun-
try also underwent two significant economic reorganizations: the communist na-
tionalization of the economy and collectivization of agriculture in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and then the shift of that wealth back into a new set of private hands 
in the 1990s.
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Although I cannot do full justice to chronicling the events that define the his-
tory of modern Hungary, a brief chronological summary is necessary to ground 
the discussion in the chapters that follow. At the beginning of the twentieth 
 century, Hungary was a Eu ro pean  middle power that ruled with Austria over a 
vast multinational empire that stretched over much of  today’s Central and East-
ern Eu rope. The Austro- Hungarian Monarchy collapsed in the final days of World 
War I, and Hungary became a demo cratic republic in 1918; a Bolshevik Soviet 
republic for several months in 1919; and then a constitutional monarchy led by 
Regent Miklós Horthy, a former naval admiral, who would remain in power  until 
 after the Nazi occupation in the final days of World War II. Horthy’s interwar gov-
ernment was po liti cally conservative, and its policies  were driven and justified by 
the demand for a return to pre- Trianon borders. This goal of territorial revision-
ism would lead Hungary to ally itself with Nazi Germany during World War II 
(although Horthy’s government would  later unsuccessfully try to reach out to 
Allied powers late in the war). In 1944–1945, Hungary was occupied first by Nazi 
Germany and then by Soviet troops. The country emerged defeated in 1945 with 
its capital city severely damaged, its territory returned to its post- Trianon borders, 
and with casualties of nearly 900,000, including almost 500,000 of Hungary’s 
Jewish citizens killed in the Holocaust.
 After the war, Hungary became a demo cratic republic, but Hungarian commu-
nists, with support from the Soviets, worked to undermine their po liti cal competi-
tors and the integrity of the election pro cess. By 1948 the communists managed 
to gain almost total control, and in 1949 they practically eliminated opposition 
parties and passed a new constitution modeled  after that of the Soviet Union. 
Over the next four de cades of communist rule, both the nature of po liti cal author-
ity and its means of legitimation would undergo several transformations. The 
harsh mea sures favored by Mátyás Rákosi, in power from 1948 to 1953, fell out 
of  favor  after Stalin’s death, and he was replaced by the more reform- minded 
Imre Nagy before then retaking power in 1955.18 The post- Stalinist thaw paved 
the way for Hungary’s brief popu lar uprising against both the returning Rákosi 
regime and Soviet rule in 1956, but this revolution was brutally suppressed by 
Soviet troops.
Over the next three de cades, János Kádár would lead Hungary, and the first 
years of his rule  were ones of violent retaliation for the 1956 revolution. Begin-
ning in the 1960s, however, Kádár’s regime gradually liberalized and attempted 
to reconcile with Hungary’s citizens by offering them a higher living standard 
(increasingly subsidized by foreign loans) that would eventually make Hungary 
the “happiest barracks in the Soviet bloc.” The regime’s economic foundations 
 were ultimately untenable, however, and  after Kádár’s forced retirement in 1988, 
the reformers who replaced him acceded to pressure from the demo cratic oppo-
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sition and began negotiations for multiparty elections that  were held in 1990. 
 These elections pushed the communists out of power, and Soviet troops left the 
country by June 1991.
This book begins in  these early years of postsocialist transformation, as Hun-
garians sought to make remake themselves as new national subjects amid the re-
mains of multiple discredited pasts and failed historical trajectories. Chapter 1, 
“Banishing Remains: The Statue Park Museum,” explores how politicians, activ-
ists, and public officials initially conceptualized the prob lem of socialist remains 
in terms of physical remainders: monuments, statues, street names, and other ob-
jects and architecture now perceived to be emblematic of the former regime. 
 These competing groups battled to “spring clean” such remains of the commu-
nist past in order to restore Hungary to the “au then tic” course of national his-
tory and to pre sent themselves as harbingers of the nation’s triumphant  future. 
The chapter focuses on the debates that resulted in the removal of Budapest’s 
socialist- era statues to a Statue Park Museum on the outskirts of the city. Sup-
porters justified the creation of the park as a demo cratic solution to the outrage 
that communist monuments inspired. Yet the removal of  these statues was not a 
response to a crisis of defacements and public dissatisfaction, but an attempt to 
cover up the fact that  little such crisis existed. Instead, many  people viewed the 
statues with fondness, amusement, or indifference. The creation of the Statue Park 
Museum thus ironically helped to produce the very prob lem it claimed to solve, 
by renarrating comfortable landmarks of urban life into newly disruptive remains.
Meanwhile, as new po liti cal parties and activist groups sought to put the re-
mains of an unwanted past to rest, they si mul ta neously revived the remains of 
previous eras in order to lay claim to  these histories’ renewed moral legitimacy. 
They recuperated statues and monuments, heroes and symbols, and historical nar-
ratives and vocabularies that state socialist authorities had officially rejected as 
fascist or reactionary, and they disinterred and reburied long- disparaged histori-
cal figures in order to consolidate their place within the new historical landscape 
of Hungary. Chapter 2, “The Hole in the Flag,” examines two significant attempts 
to replace the remains of communist history with new demo cratic content dur-
ing the first de cade of postsocialism: first, the po liti cal  battles to claim the revo-
lutionary inheritance of Hungary’s failed rebellion against Soviet rule in 1956, and 
second, the commemorative activities of the center- right Fidesz co ali tion in power 
between 1998 and 2002 (epitomized in the 2000 cele brations of the millennium 
of Hungary’s statehood and Christianization). In dif fer ent ways, each of  these 
efforts strove to transform a national community united by pessimism and per-
ceptions of victimhood into a victorious, forward- looking citizenry. But, like the 
Statue Park Museum,  these attempts to create new historical foundations for post-
socialist Hungary would also strug gle with the recent memory of Kádárism.
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By the late 1990s, attempts to master the recent past would take a surprising 
turn. Chapter 3, “Nostalgia and the Remains of Everyday Life,” argues that the 
vari ous attempts to distance the past described in the previous two chapters be-
came the condition for its return in the form of nostalgia for socialist mass and 
popu lar culture. It thus shifts the discussion of remains of socialism from anachro-
nistic monuments and devalued historical narratives to the detritus of an everyday 
life now on the brink of vanis hing: from candy bars and soda pop to the songs of 
the Young Pioneers. Despite appearances, this nostalgia did not represent a wistful 
desire to return to the previous era, nor simply the gleeful impulse to laugh at state 
socialist kitsch found years  earlier. Rather,  these consumers used nostalgia for the 
detritus of an everyday life now on the brink of vanis hing to both distance the past 
and give it new value. By detaching fond communal memories of  these objects 
from the po liti cal system that produced them, nostalgia recuperated socialist re-
mains as a novel form of national inheritance. This ironic invocation of the inter-
national discourse of cultural heritage to legitimate the trash of the previous era 
enabled Hungarians to redefine themselves as both savvy cap i tal ist consumers and 
cultured demo cratic citizens: equal—if not indeed superior—to their Western 
counter parts.
By the second de cade of postsocialism, widespread disenchantment with the 
experience of “transition” would replace such claims to victory with new laments 
of victimization that revived the buried past in the hopes of breaking with it anew. 
The final three chapters of this book examine this transformation in how remains 
 were conceptualized in party politics, cultural debates, and everyday discourses 
of complaint. As both explanation and evidence of the failure of transition’s prom-
ised transformations, the per sis tence of remains would enable vari ous po liti cal 
and social groups to give voice not only to their past victimization by state social-
ism, but also to their con temporary frustrations with cap i tal ist transformation, 
new forms of social in equality and stratification, and the pressures of membership 
in the Eu ro pean Union, which Hungary joined in 2004.
Chapter 4, “Recovering National Victimhood at the House of Terror,” explores 
how the center- right Fidesz- led co ali tion government revived remains as a loom-
ing threat in Hungary’s postsocialist culture and politics at the time of the 2002 
elections. Key to this shift in the politics of memory was Fidesz’s creation of a 
controversial museum to commemorate Hungary’s victims of fascism and com-
munism: the House of Terror, located on one of Budapest’s most elegant boule-
vards. If the Statue Park Museum, opened nearly a de cade  earlier, was created to 
lay the socialist past to rest by mastering its vis i ble remains, the purpose of the 
House of Terror was to revive the remains of socialism as a hidden danger that 
threatened Hungary once more. And although the Statue Park Museum’s demo-
cratic preservation of socialism’s monuments ultimately attracted few visitors, 
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the House of Terror’s rhe toric of victimization would make it enduringly popu lar 
with a public that increasingly blamed the per sis tence of socialist remains for the 
failure to enter transition’s promised  future.
Chapter 5, “Secrets, Inheritance, and a Generation’s Remains,” demonstrates 
how this rhe toric of communist terror and the danger of its return would soon 
extend past party politics to encompass intimate friendships and  family relation-
ships. The prob lem of the communist regime’s informers— and their moral respon-
sibility to both the past and the present- day— increasingly inspired public debate in 
the second de cade of postsocialism. One crucial way  these conflicts took shape was 
through the charged idiom of  family and generational conflict,  whether that en-
tailed betrayal by cultural elders (as in the case of the celebrated filmmaker István 
Szabó) or  actual parent (explored in the work of novelist Péter Esterházy). By 
phrasing the call to accountability as a  matter of generational inheritance,  Hungary’s 
cultural “ children” reconceptualized the prob lem of socialism’s remains as not only 
the challenge of banishing the past, but the fear of reproducing it in the  future.
As the twentieth anniversary of 1989 approached, new po liti cal and economic 
crises appeared to threaten the success of Hungary’s postsocialist transformations. 
In 2006, on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 revolution, right- wing demon-
strators protested the socialist- led government, which had admitted to lying to 
win the election. Two years  later in 2008, the global financial crisis hit Hungary 
with disproportionate force, leading to the first- ever International Monetary 
Fund bailout of an EU country. Chapter 6, “A Past Returned, A  Future Deferred,” 
examines how the experience of  these crises fueled renewed complaints that 
remains of socialism prevented Hungarians from attaining a “normal” life of po-
liti cal civility and economic prosperity. As Hungary approached the twentieth 
anniversary of 1989, the memory of the transition now only inspired the lament 
that “communism never ended.”
The conclusion discusses the transformations in Hungary’s politics of mem-
ory since the 2010 return to power of Fidesz, which has now become a right- 
wing populist party. Fidesz hailed its electoral victory as enabling Hungary to 
fi nally achieve transition and leave the socialist past  behind. Yet its critics argue 
that beneath the government’s anticommunist rhe toric lie authoritarian policies 
that have turned back the clock on many of Hungary’s postsocialist demo cratic 
transformations. This chapter examines Fidesz’s recent attempts to redefine 
Hungary’s po liti cal and memorial landscape and discusses the opposition to 
 these efforts. Ironically, both Fidesz and its opponents have revived the threat of 
socialist remains to warn of pre sent and impending danger:  whether in the form 
of an EU bureaucracy that Fidesz compares to the Soviets or in the ways that  those 
who oppose Fidesz’s policies liken con temporary social and po liti cal condi-
tions to life  under late state socialism.  These strategies suggest that remains of 
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socialism—as sites to enact mastery of the past and to imagine desired and dreaded 
 futures— will endure in years to come.
Background and Methods
This book draws on fieldwork and archival research conducted in Budapest and 
a village in northeastern Hungary over the past twenty years.19 Its origins, how-
ever, lie in my first trip to Hungary in 1993 as an En glish teacher in a small vil-
lage located a ninety- minute train  ride from Budapest. Like many young  people 
who came of age with the fall of the Berlin Wall, I was  eager to travel to the for-
mer Soviet bloc and dismantle the Cold War fears and fantasies that had struc-
tured my childhood. During my time in the village, as I taught classes of  children 
and adults the rudiments of En glish vocabulary and grammar, I lacked both the 
linguistic and cultural knowledge to fully make sense of the ways the transforma-
tions of postsocialism  were influencing the material and imaginative worlds of 
the  people I met and lived with. My diary and letters from that time instead pre-
sent a cata log of post– Cold War clichés that sought out the most vis i ble signs of 
change, contradiction, and difference compared to what I considered to be North 
American norms. I noted that many villa gers had satellite dishes, yet the entire 
village had only one telephone, and I marveled at the heterogeneity of the built 
environment even in the center of Budapest, where signs warned of crumbling 
building facades next door to glossy new business centers. I also recorded, with-
out entirely understanding, how the economic challenges of postsocialism  were 
dislocating its subjects,  whether the Russian- language instructors at the school 
where I taught who  were frantically trying to learn En glish in order to transfer 
their teaching skills to a more marketable language, or my own host  family’s sud-
den purchase of a variety store on the outskirts of the village during my weeks 
living in their home, through which they hoped to supplement their professional 
salaries.
Most of all, I was struck by the way my status as a mixed- race visitor, from a 
country (the United States) commonly considered to lack culture or history, in-
spired many of the  people I met to want to educate me about the defining events 
of Hungary’s past: from the el derly  couple in the village who invited me into their 
home to pre sent with  great ceremony a framed map of the territory of Greater 
Hungary, to the acquaintances who dismissed my questions about Holocaust me-
morials with the argument that Hungarians had suffered longer and worse  under 
communism, to the filmmakers I interviewed a few years  later who emphasized 
the Hungarian origins of some of old Hollywood’s most famous directors.  Others, 
of course, rejected  these claims or minimized their significance, but I soon realized 
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that even the fact of passionate disagreement embedded them in the same inter-
pretative community, anxiously concerned with the task of remembering or for-
getting properly.  These self- reflexive discourses signaled concerns not only 
about what constitutes au then tic national history but also about the status of the 
nation engaged in such historical introspection.
When I first began research for this book, I was  eager to put  these experiences 
into a broader context, using this question of memory as a lens through which to 
understand how the po liti cal transformations had demanded equally far- reaching 
changes to the ways Hungarians lived and narrated their lives. Specifically, I was 
concerned with the materiality of memory, such as new museums, memorials, 
and the topic that would become the first chapter of this book: Budapest’s Statue 
Park Museum of communist- era statues. During my initial field research, how-
ever, I soon discovered that for the most part such official sites of memory had 
become well- established and  were no longer active topics in public discourse. 
This would soon change with the opening of the House of Terror in 2002 and the 
shifting po liti cal circumstances that would give the “prob lem” of official repre-
sen ta tions of the recent past renewed urgency in Hungary’s second de cade of post-
socialism. Nonetheless, this initial challenge forced me to reconsider the very 
assumptions that structured my proj ect. Why, at that moment, did such official 
relics of the socialist past no longer interest the  people I worked with—at least, not 
framed in the way I first presented it?
Initially, I continued to pursue my original research strategy on state attempts 
to materialize new historical narratives and visions of collective memory in Hun-
gary’s cultural landscape: traveling to sites and events, collecting archival materials, 
and gathering life histories oriented around questions of personal and historical 
remembrance. In so  doing, however, I soon realized that the apparent absence 
or “failure” of certain forms of memory— and the commentary such absences 
inspired— were themselves topics of analy sis. Moreover, my desire to locate the 
cultural pro cess of working through the past in the most obvious and literal re-
mains of socialism was excluding other more ambivalent and dynamic ways 
through which memory and knowledge of the socialist era  were taking shape.
My focus thus shifted from what was enshrined as cultural heritage to include 
 those physical and symbolic remainders that  were being excluded as trivial, value-
less, and/or culturally “inauthentic.” Attentive not only to what was (and was not) 
being said but also to when and in what contexts, I de cided to track the produc-
tion of remains of socialism across a number of registers: from monumentalized 
histories to ephemeral media events, and from official narratives of historical 
martyrdom to the circulation of jokes, rumors, gossip, and complaints. I also 
expanded my scope to trace the trajectory of postsocialist memorial practices 
over a time span of more than two de cades. My focus on the longitudinal aspects 
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of cultural memory helped me to trace the vari ous ways specific remains shifted 
in and out of cultural focus, as well as how  these remains responded to the provo-
cations of other conflicting and overlapping commemorative practices:  whether 
competing claims to victimization or attempts to demonize other memories (such 
as socialist nostalgia) as pathological.
As a result, my research strategy expanded to examine a more contested and 
heterogeneous set of cultural objects and discursive sites. I also spoke with a more 
varied range of interpretative communities (from representatives of po liti cal par-
ties and activist groups to filmmakers and other artists, and from museum cura-
tors and visitors to marketers and consumers of “socialist nostalgia”). I conducted 
semi structured interviews that included life histories as well as interviews on more 
specific topics that ranged from retro pop  music fandoms to the cultural heritage 
policies of vari ous government regimes. My interview subjects included mem-
bers of Budapest’s cultural and po liti cal elites— including well- known intellectu-
als, artists, film studio heads, and government officials— but I focused my efforts 
on selecting individuals from both Budapest and the village who would provide 
a sample that was as representative as pos si ble of age, occupation, and po liti cal 
affiliation within Hungary’s highly polarized po liti cal spectrum (from far- right 
supporters to members of the Hungarian Workers’ Party).20 I interviewed some 
 people only once; I met with  others repeatedly over the span of many years.
In addition, I conducted research at the Budapest General Assembly and local 
district archives to collect minutes of parliamentary debates concerning the fate 
of Budapest’s statues, and I collected media reports at the Open Society Archives 
and the library at Hungary’s Parliament in order to chronicle the  battles to de-
termine the contours of national memory during the years preceding and directly 
following the po liti cal transformation. I also performed site and event analy sis at 
locations that included the Statue Park Museum, yearly film festivals, the Magyar 
Millennium cele brations, all- night nostalgia parties, and musical per for mances.
Perhaps most importantly I participated in the textures and routines of Buda-
pest’s everyday life— from meeting friends and attending lectures, festivals, and 
per for mances to shopping for groceries, attending exercise classes, and standing 
in line at the post office to pay my bills—in order to immerse myself in the social 
life of the city and the circulation of urban knowledge and gossip. I also balanced 
my involvement in the life of Hungary’s capital with regular visits to the villages 
where I had taught En glish before beginning my fieldwork. Visiting village 
friends and my former host families periodically not only gave me the opportu-
nity to participate in the  family life of my former hosts and to attend village 
events, but also provided a sense of community and continuity sometimes lack-
ing in the more socially fragmented environment of Budapest.
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Fi nally, my sources included con temporary books, newspapers and maga-
zines, film, tele vi sion, advertisements, museum exhibitions, and internet discus-
sions and websites. I drew on  these materials as both primary sources and cultural 
artifacts through which to analyze the emergence of Hungary’s demo cratic post-
socialist public culture. In par tic u lar, I was interested in media events and scan-
dals as “revelatory incidents” (Fernandez 1986, xi) that illuminated— however 
temporarily— ongoing spheres of public debate. Their very newsworthiness and 
atypicality provided the means to better understand the cultural norms  these sto-
ries  violated (or epitomized), and they also provided another idiom through 
which my interlocutors offered cultural commentary and reflected on their own 
experiences.
The first chapter begins with one such “problematic semiotic object” (Domin-
guez 1989, 43): Budapest’s Statue Park Museum of communist- era monuments, 
opened during the tumultuous yet optimistic early years of postsocialism. The out-
come of heated debates among politicians, art historians, and city authorities, 
the creation of the park in 1993 transformed everyday landmarks into threaten-
ing remains, and thus helped to make “transition” a vis i ble fact on the landscape 
of the city. And like the opening of the pizzeria Marxim, this per for mance of mas-
tery over an unwanted past would provide a spectacle that appealed not only to 
residents of Budapest but also to a Western media  eager to confirm their own 
post– Cold War fantasies about the triumph of democracy and market capitalism.
